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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

This case involves a claim for worker's compensation benefits for pain allegedly caused
by medical treatment for an industrial injury. Respondent injured his lower back while in the
course and scope of employment. He then proceeded to receive medical treatment for his lower
back, including injections, which were covered by workers' compensation insurance. Following
a right-side injection at L3-4, Respondent repmied an onset of left-side groin pain that has
allegedly not gone away. Respondent sought worker's compensation benefits for the groin pain.
However, the only evidence to support a causal relationship between the injection and the groin
pain is the alleged temporal onset of pain. There is no medical expert testimony based on
objective evidence establishing a causal relationship on a more probable than not basis
between the right-side back injection and the left-side groin pain. Rather, there is testimony

from multiple doctors identifying multiple reasons, based on objective findings, that there is no
causal relationship on a more probable than not basis.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

A worker's compensation hearing was held on January 16, 2019, to address whether
Respondent's groin pain was caused by a steroid injection he received for his industrial back
injury. R. 89. Following the hearing, Respondent took the post-hearing depositions of
Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Thompson. R. 23, 25. Appellants took the post-hearing depositions of
Dr. Gussner, Dr. Hajjar, and Dr. Cox. R. 27-28. Two other doctors, Dr. Schwaiisman and
Dr. Krafft, were not deposed, but they offered written opinions that were made exhibits at the
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hearing. Ex. 22 at 677; Ex. 27 at 1651. The parties then submitted post-hearing briefs. R. 3088.

Respondent relied upon the opinions of Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Thompson to support his
claim that the back injection caused his groin pain. R. 42. However, these two doctors failed to
identify any objective evidence to support their opinions that there was a causal relationship.
Thompson Tr. 13:12-18; Frizzell Tr. 33:23-34:11. They relied on the alleged temporal onset of
Respondent's subjective pain complaints. Thompson Tr. 13:12-18; Frizzell Tr. 33:23-34:11.
Appellants rebutted Respondent's claim with the opinions of Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner,
Dr. Cox, Dr. Schwartsman, and Dr. Krafft. R. 48. Notably, four of these five doctors treated
Respondent. See id; Exs. 22, 25, 27, 28. Each concluded, on a more probable than not basis,
that there was no causal relationship between the back injection and the groin pain, finding no
objective evidence to support causation. Ex. 22 at 677; Ex. 25 at 1633, 1637; Ex. 27 at 1651;
Ex. 28 at 1730-31; Ex. 32 at 2025-26; Hajjar Tr. 20:3-17, 29:22-30:3; Gussner Tr. 31 :19-32:1,
33:18-34:9; Cox Tr. 37:14-38:25, 40:12-18. Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, and Dr. Cox each
provided their medical opinion during post-hearing depositions that Respondent's alleged
temporal onset of pain was insufficient, in and of itself, to establish causation. Hajjar Tr. 32: 1033: 12; GussnerTr. 33:7-12; Cox Tr. 20:25-21:8.
1
The case was assigned to Referee Harper, who decided in his Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation that Respondent had proven causation. R. 89, 111.
However, in reaching that decision, Referee Harper chose not to rely on any one doctor's

1 Referee Powers presided over the hearing. R. 89. However, he retired before the matter was
decided, and the matter was transferred to Referee Harper. Id (The parties stipulated that the
case did not need to be reheard. Id)
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opinion. R. 110 ~ 65. Rather, he formed his own medical opinion of causation based on isolated
statements of doctors who had reached the opposite conclusion-that the injection did not cause
the groin pain. R. 110-11 ~,I 65, 67. He also relied on other evidence that was not opinions from
any of the testifying doctors. See id. None of the evidence that Referee Harper ultimately relied
upon constitutes medical expert testimony establishing causation to a reasonable degree of
medical probability. See id. The decision is based solely and improperly on the alleged temporal
onset of groin pain claimed by Respondent and is justified by a remote possibility that a rightside injection could cause left-side groin pain. See R. 108-11; infra§ IV.A-B.
The Industrial Commission issued an order adopting Referee Harper's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. R. 113. Respondent timely filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Industrial Commission, pointing out that Referee Harper failed to follow the appropriate legal
standards for finding causation, failed to appropriately weigh the medical opinions, considered
and gave weight to evidence not relied upon by any of the medical experts, failed to consider key
evidence, and drew conclusions not supported by the evidence. R. 115-36. The Industrial
Commission denied the motion, concluding that the Referee did not e!T and that the case was not
decided solely on temporal relationship. R. 161-73. However, the Industrial Commission
ignored many of Appellants' arguments and failed to identify medical evidence providing an
objective basis to support a finding of causation. See id.

C.

Concise Statement of the Facts.
Respondent injured his lower back while working on December 2, 2014. R. 91 ,I 1. He

began receiving treatment that same day for lower back pain. Ex. 26 at 1638. The next day,
Respondent rep011ed pain travelling down the right leg to the ankle. Ex. 19 at 553. These
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reported symptoms persisted and led to an MRI, which showed multilevel degenerative
spondylosis and a right asymmetric disc extrusion at L3-4. Ex. 19 at 559-60; Ex. 36 at 2065.
Based on this imaging, Respondent's treating physician recommended a steroid injection. Ex. 19
at 567.
Respondent received his first steroid injection at Intermountain Medical Imaging on
December 22, 2014. Ex. 35 at 2052. It was an SP fluoroscopic guided translaminar epidural
injection on the right side at the L3-4 level. Id. Respondent reported a pain level of 8-10 before
the injection and no pain after the injection. Id.
Respondent received his second steroid injection at Intermountain Medical Imaging on
January 8, 2015, at approximately 8:00 a.m. Ex. 35 at 2042, 2057-58. It was the exact same
type of injection as the first injection, an SP fluoroscopic guided translaminar epidural injection
on the right side at the L3-4 level. Id. at 2042. Respondent reported a pain level of 6 prior to
the injection and a pain level of 3-4 after the injection. Id. The physician who performed the
injection wrote in the report: "Patient tolerated the procedure well, and there were no immediate
complications." Id. There is no reference to or suggestion of an immediate onset of pain during
the injection, let alone anything on the left side. See id.
Respondent was given a "Diagnostic Block Sheet" to fill out after his second steroid
injection. Ex. 35 at 2055, 2060. Respondent "filled it out as he went/' not all at once, and then
sent it back to Intermountain Medical Imaging. Hr'g Tr. 28:3-18. During the first five hours
after the injection, Respondent marked that his pain steadily decreased to a level 2. Ex. 3 5 at
2055, 2060. Respondent also drew a line to the front left groin on the diagram of a human body
and wrote: "Became very uncomfortable a few hours after injection." Id. ( emphasis added).
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A couple of weeks after the injection, on January 21, 2015, Respondent went to
Dr. Hajjar, a neurosurgeon, for examination. Ex. 25 at 1606; Hajjar Tr. 4:19-20, 5:15-25.
Respondent reported having developed pain in the left groin. Ex. 25 at 1605-06; Hajjar Tr. 8:199:24. By March, Respondent was complaining oflower back pain and bilateral pain in his legs.
Ex. 25 at 1608, 1610. Based on these complaints, Dr. Hajjar recommended smgery. Hajjar Tr.
13:24-14:10.
On April 6, 2015, Respondent underwent back surgery by Dr. Hajjar. Ex. 25 at 1610-11;
Hajjar Tr. 13:24-14:10. Although the herniated disk was on the right side, Dr. Hajjar performed
a bilateral surgery at the L3-4 level, including a microdiscectomy and decompression. Id.; Hajjar
Tr. 14:21-15:16. Dr. Hajjar made sure that the nerves on both sides were free, i.e., that they
were not stuck or tethered. Hajjar Tr. 15:17-16:2. He did not want to go in a second time to
work on the left side. Hajjar Tr. 15:7-16.
The surgery resolved Respondent's back pain, but not his groin pain. See Ex. 25 at 1628.
Consequently, Respondent continued to seek treatment. Dr. Hajjar felt that Respondent had a
hip issue and referred Respondent to Dr. Gussner, who treated Respondent between July and
September 2015. Ex. 25 at 1631; Ex. 28 at 1652-98. Dr. Gussner identified several possible
explanations as to the cause of Respondent's groin pain, including iliopsoas bursitis. Ex. 28 at
1658. None of the explanations were nerve pain from the back. Id. ("I do not feel the current
pain is related to his back.") However, by September 2015, after testing some of the
possibilities, Dr. Gussner had not determined what was causing the groin pain. Ex. 25 at 1698.
Dr. Gussner recommended that Respondent taper off opioid medication and return to
Dr. Schwartsman for a possible bone scan. Id. Respondent went to Dr. Schwartsman, who did
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not to order a bone scan but instead referred Respondent to Dr. Frizzell. Ex. 22 at 671. In
October 2015, Respondent went to see Dr. Frizzell, another neurosurgeon, who did not give
Respondent an affirmative diagnosis. Ex. 29 at 1738. Rather, he stated only his suspicion that
Respondent's pain was related to peripheral nerves. Ex. 29 at 1738; Frizzell Tr. 22:22-25. He
then referred Respondent to Dr. Thompson for pain management. Ex. 29 at 1738.
Dr. Thompson began treating Respondent in November 2015, and she continued to treat
Respondent for at least two years. Thompson Tr. 6:5-11; Ex. 30 at 1754-1954. She treated
Respondent by prescribing multiple medications, including opioid medication. See, e.g., Ex. 30
at 1768, 1779, 1783. In May 2016, she installed a pain pump to administer fentanyl and other
medications. Id at 1799-80, 1809. This treatment was provided despite the fact that Respondent
continually tested positive for THC-COOH over a one and a half year period. Id at 1761, 1765,
1776, 1786, 1833, 1935, 1941, 1953-54.
When Respondent had his first appointment with Dr. Gussner on July 16, 2015, he
reported sharp and stabbing pain in his left groin at a level 5 of 10. Ex. 28 at 1652, 1663. At his
first appointment with Dr. Thompson on November 10, 2015, Respondent reported aching,
throbbing, sharp, and constant pain in his left hip, worse with abduction and flexion, and rated it
a level 7 of 10 to 10 of 10. Ex. 30 at 1754. During his deposition in April 2018, Respondent
testified that his condition had gotten "progressively worse" and rated his average pain as a level
7 of 10 to 8 of 10. Ex. 4 at 60:12-14. At the hearing in this matter on January 16, 2019,
Respondent against testified that his condition had "gotten worse." Hr'g Tr. 44:1-5. He
explained that the pain started out at a lower level at the time of the injection and then got
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progressively worse. Id 59:18-60:2. He denied that the pain was excruciating at the time of the
injection. Id. 60:3-19. Rather, it allegedly became excruciating later in time. Id

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law because it failed to
follow the appropriate legal standards for deciding causation.

2.

Whether there is substantial and competent medical evidence to support the
Industrial Commission's finding that Respondent's left-side groin condition is a
casually related compensable consequence of treatment he received for injuries
sustained as a result of his accepted industrial accident of December 2, 2014.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free
review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial
and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings." Fowble v. Snoline Exp., Inc., 146
Idaho 70, 74, 190 P.3d 889, 893 (2008).
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind may accept to support a conclusion. Substantial
and competent evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence, but
less than a preponderance. [This Comt] will not disturb the
Commission's conclusions on the weight and credibility of the
evidence unless those conclusions are clearly erroneous.

Aguilar v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 164 Idaho 893,899,436 P.3d 1242, 1248 (2019). The
Court may set aside the Commission's order if:
(1) the commission's findings of fact are not based on any
substantial competent evidence; (2) the commission has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (3) the findings of
fact, order or award were procured by fraud; or (4) the findings of
fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award.

Fowble, 146 Idaho at 74, 190 P.3d at 893; IDAHO CODE§ 72-732.
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Industrial Commission Erred as a Matter of Law Because It Failed to Follow
the Appropriate Legal Standards for Deciding Causation.
In deciding causation, the Industrial Commission recited the correct legal standards but

then failed to follow them. First, the Industrial Commission recognized that Respondent bore the
burden of proof and that he was required to present medical evidence to support his claim to a
reasonable degree of medical probability. R. 95

,r 23.

However, the Industrial Commission

disregarded this standard and instead based its decision on a purported preponderance of
evidence standard. R. 111 at Conclusions of Law. Second, the Industrial Commission
recognized that its role is to determine the weight and credibility of medical testimony, not to
form its own medical opinion. R. 163. And yet, it fmmed its own medical opinion rather than
deciding which medical opinion carried the most weight and should be followed. R. 110-11

,r,r 65-67.

Third, the Industrial Commission recognized that temporal onset of pain is not enough

to establish causation. R. 95

,r 23, 110 ,r 67.

Nevertheless, and despite its assertions to the

contrary, the Industrial Commission based the entirety of its decision on Respondent's alleged
temporal onset of pain, failing to identify any medical expert testimony based on objective
medical evidence or other reliable reasoning to support a finding of causation. R. 110-11
1.

,r 67.

The Industrial Commission failed to determine whether Respondent met his
burden of proving causation with a reasonable degree of medical probability.

The Industrial Commission decided that Respondent proved causation by a
"preponderance of the evidence." R. 111. In doing so, the Industrial Commission clearly
applied the wrong standard and thereby erred.

-849508.0010.13254168.5

"Preponderance of the evidence" is the standard by which an employee must prove that
an accident occun-ed during the course and scope of employment. Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 138
Idaho 309, 312, 63 P.3d 435,438 (2003). Medical evidence is not required to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that an accident occun-ed. Id. Rather, credible testimony from
the employee may be enough. Id.; see also Beardsley v. Idaho Forest Indus., 127 Idaho 404,
407, 901 P.2d 511, 514 (1995).

2

"Reasonable degree of medical probability" is the standard by which an employee must
prove that an accident caused a compensable injury. Hart v. Kaman Bearing & Supply, 130
Idaho 296, 299, 939 P.2d 1375, 1378 (1997). To recover workers' compensation benefits, the
claimant "can-ies the burden ofproof that to a reasonable degree of medical probability the
injury for which benefits are claimed is causally related to an accident occun-ing in the course of
employment." Id. (emphasis added) (affirming the Industrial Commission' s decision to follow
one medical opinion over another that the need for treatment was not caused by an industrial
accident); see also Gerdon v. Con Paulos, Inc., 160 Idaho 335, 340-41, 372 P.3d 390, 396-97
(2016) (affirming a finding that a doctor's opinion was entitled to little weight and was
insufficient to meet the claimant's burden of proof). In other words, the claimant must prove "a

probable, not merely a possible, causal connection between the employment and the injury or
disease." Jordan v. Dean Foods, 160 Idaho 794, 799, 379 P.3d 1064, 1069 (2016) (emphasis
added). "Proof of a possible causal link is insufficient to satisfy the burden." Hart, 130 Idaho at
2 "Preponderance of the evidence" is the standard applied in other types of cases where medical
evidence is not required. Harris v. Elec. Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 3, 105 P.3d 267, 269 (2004)
(requiring an employer to prove misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence to avoid liability
for unemploymen t benefits); Edwards v. Indep. Servs., Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 914, 104 P.3d 954,
956 (2004) (requiring an employee who voluntarily separated from employment to prove that the
separation was for good cause by a preponderance of the evidence).
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299, 939 P.2d at 1378 (emphasis added). "The issue of causation must be proved by expert
medical testimony." Id. (citing Langley v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 126 Idaho 781,
890 P.2d 732 (1995)).
In finding causation based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Industrial
Commission relied on "totality" of evidence, including evidence that was not expert medical
testimony. This evidence included (1) Respondent's testimony, (2) piecemeal testimony of
doctors who recognized a possibility of an injection causing groin pain but concluding, on a
more probable than not basis, that the injection did not cause groin pain, (3) the course of
Respondent's treatment, and (4) the lack of an allegedly persuasive alternative explanation.
None of this evidence supports a finding of causation within a reasonable degree of medical
probability.

a.

Respondent's testimony does not meet the applicable standard.

The primary basis for the Industrial Commission's decision is its conclusion that
Respondent testified credibly that he had an immediate onset of pain during the back injection on
January 8, 2015. R. 108 ,r 59; R. 110 ,r 67; R. 165-72. This reliance on Respondent's testimony
is misplaced. His testimony is not medical expert testimony. Nor does it establish medical
probability, especially considering, as recognized by the Industrial Commission, that
Respondent's testimony regarding the history of his pain was inconsistent. R. 168.
Respondent's testimony could be relevant in determining the weight to give to the various
medical opinions, but the Industrial Commission did not use its analysis of Respondent's
testimony for that purpose. See R. 171-72.
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The Industrial Commission was prompted to evaluate Respondent's credibility because
his testimony conflicted with a document he filled out at the time of the injection. After
litigation of this matter commenced, in his deposition and at hearing, Respondent testified that he
had an immediate onset of pain during his injection on January 8, 2015. Ex. 4, 59:2-62:3; Hr'g
Tr. 27:7-13, 59:18-60:10. In his deposition, he characterized the pain he felt as "extreme" pain.
Ex. 4, 58:14-19. At hearing, he testified that the pain he felt at the time of the injection was
"probably a four or a five ... [m]aybe even three" and that within a month it became
"excruciating." Hr'g Tr. 59:18-60:23. However, in the Diagnostic Block Sheet that Respondent
began filling out the day of the injection, Respondent wrote that he began feeling
"uncomfortable" in the groin "a few hours" after the injection. Ex. 35 at 2055, 2060.
The Industrial Commission concluded, without any supporting medical opinion, that the
Diagnostic Block Sheet was "not inherently at odds with Respondent's deposition and hearing
testimony." R. 171. However, several of the doctors who provided opinions in this case,
Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, and Dr. Cox, viewed the testimony as inconsistent. Hajjar Tr. 20:3-17,
32:10-33:12; Gussner Tr. 48:19--49:5; Cox Tr. 59:6-12, 64:20-65:9.
The fact that Respondent documented becoming uncomfortable a few hours after the
injection was one of several factors considered by Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, and Dr. Cox in
concluding that the injection did not cause Respondent's groin pain. Hajjar Tr. 23:2-23, 25:4-19;
Gussner Tr. 27:5-9, 34:16-25; Cox Tr. 15:12-17:12. Assuming arguendo that the discrepancy
was not material as the Industrial Commission implied, Respondent's testimony that he had an
immediate onset of pain during the injection did not change Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, or
Dr. Cox's conclusions. Hajjar Tr. 32:10-33:12; Gussner Tr. 33:7-12; Cox. Tr. 41:12-25. These
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doctors testified during post-hearing depositions that Respondent's testimony was still
insufficient to support a finding of causation in light of the normal nerve conductions, the normal
reflexes, the lack of changes to the muscles, the type of injection given, and the localization of
the pain to the groin (as opposed to radiating). Hajjar Tr. 20:3-17, 32:10-33:12; Gussner Tr.
21:16-22:11; Cox Tr. 35:25-38:25.
What the doctors think about Respondent's testimony and reports of pain is what matters,
especially considering that they all had the opp01tunity to examine Respondent. The Industrial
Commission has not observed Respondent. Further, the Commissioners are not medical
providers or otherwise qualified to diagnose causation based on their assessment of Respondent's
testimony in relation to physical findings. Here, the Industrial Commission did not use
Respondent's testimony to evaluate the weight or credibility of any of the medical opinions in
this case. Rather, the Industrial Commission improperly used Respondent's testimony as an
independent basis for its decision. Respondent's testimony is not medical evidence of causation
to a reasonable degree of medical probability and should not have been relied upon.

b.

Piecemeal testimony of experts does not meet the applicable standard.

In an attempt to get beyond the insufficiency of the alleged temporal onset of pain as the
sole basis for establishing causation, the Industrial Commission relied on discrete statements by
doctors who found the groin pain was not causally related. That is, to justify its decision, the
Industrial Commission relied upon: (a) select testimony by Dr. Hajjar of a potential for a nerve
at the L3 level to innervate the groin (R. 107 il 55, R. 110 il 67) and a possibility of a causal
connection if there were evidence of significant pain at the time of the injection (R. 100, 111

ilil 36, 67; R.

172), and (b) select testimony by Dr. Gussner that it is possible to have nerve
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damage and not have it show up on a nerve conduction study (R. 103, 111

,r,r 45, 67).

None of

this testimony constitutes objective evidence of causation let alone evidence to a reasonable
degree of medical probability. Moreover, in relying on this testimony, the Industrial
Commission took it out of context and disregarded the reasons Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner gave
as to why these possibilities were not medically sufficient to establish causation on a more
probable than not basis.
Dr. Hajjar testified that the nerve at the L3 level can innervate the groin area. Hajjar
Tr. 9:14-24. Yet, he recognized that there can be a lot of other causes of pain in the groin area
other than nerve pain. Id. Dr. Hajjar also acknowledged that "overwhelming" pain at the time of
the injection "implies a potential nerve injury." HajjarTr. 32:20-33:8 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the Industrial Commission's assertion, he did not concede that something unexpected
actually happened to the nerve root if Respondent's discomf011 came on as he now insists.
R. 172; Hajjar Tr. 25:4-14, 32:10-33:12. Further, to completely undercut the relevance of this
theoretical potential, Dr. Hajjar stated that he found no evidence of a nerve injury based on his
review of the medical records, Respondent's pathology, and what Respondent wrote on the
Diagnostic Block sheet. Hajjar Tr. 25:4-14, 33:10-12; Ex. 25 at 1635-37.
Dr. Hajjar found multiple reasons that the right-side L3-4 injection did not cause left
groin pain on a more probable than not basis. Hajjar Tr. 20:12-15, 22:20-21, 23:13-18, 27:6-9,
28: 13-30: 12. Dr. Hajjar explained that the steroid injection at issue was given on the right side
and that "it would be ltard to hurt tlie left side from a rig/it sided injection if you tried to." Id
at 22:20-21 (emphasis added). He also noted that Respondent reported becoming uncomfortable
a few hours after the injection on the Diagnostic Block Sheet and stated that he would have
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expected a report of instant pain, not pain a few hours later. Id. at 23:13-18, 27:6-9. Dr. Hajjar
found no evidence that would be typical of a nerve injury, such as pain in the nerve distribution
(as opposed to a single spot of pain) or muscle changes from nerve denervation, which would
have shown up in a test more than three years after the injection ifthere was a nerve injury. Id.
20:12-15, 28:13-29:3. Instead, he found that Respondent "had a hip issue," with evidence of
joint effusion around the left hip and iliopsoas bursitis in the left hip. Id. at 20:15-17, 39:13-21;
Ex. 25 at 1633. Taking all of this into account, Dr. Hajjar concluded: "I don't see how that
would be possible [to cause left side groin pain], given that set of circumstances and history,
especially given the fact that the injection was done on the opposite side." Hajjar Tr. 27:9-12
(emphasis added).
Dr. Gussner recognized that some level of nerve damage might not be picked up in
electrodiagnostic testing. Gussner Tr. 32:2-6. However, this does not capture the entirety of his
testimony and his opinion as to causation. Dr. Gussner also said that he would expect significant
nerve damage to show in a nerve conduction study. Id. The record is void of such evidence.
Respondent has continued to complain of severe groin pain but has had three normal nerve
conduction studies. Ex. 4 at 60:12-14; Hr'g Tr. 52:16-19, 63:10-13 (claiming to have level seven
pain with the pain pump which he considers to be "severe"); Gussner Tr. 30: 10-32: 1, 31: 1932: 1; Exs. 27, 34. Dr. Gussner testified that one "can certainly have immediate pain during an
injection[, but] [h]aving lifelong pain after an injection without any objective findings is
improbable." Gussner Tr. at 49:24-50:2 (emphasis added). He also explained that the
"placement of a needle for L3-4 interlaminer epidural steroid injection is not even close to the
left Ll or L2 nerve roots, which would have a referral pattern to the left anterior hip, groin, and
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medial thigh." Ex. 28 at 1731. Further, the images of the injection show that it was on the right
side and was not close to the exiting nerve roots. Gussner Tr. 22:1-11. According to
Dr. Gussner, the only objective evidence that exists that explains any of Respondent's pain is
iliopsoas bursitis in the left hip. Gussner Tr. 32:24-33 :6; Ex. 28 at 1730-31; Ex. 36 at 2081.
In sum, Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner did not offer any medical opinions that the right-side
injection could or did cause Respondent's left-side groin pain on a more probable than not basis.

c.

Evidence regarding Respondent's course of treatment does not meet
the applicable standard.

The Industrial Commission also relied upon evidence of Respondent's course of
treatment to supp011 its finding of causation. Nothing in the Findings of Fact specifically
identifies what treatment the Industrial Commission found persuasive. The indication is that the
Industrial Commission considered the fact that Respondent received a steroid injection in the
3
groin that did not help, did not respond to other forms of conservative treatment, and had a

fentanyl pain pump installed. R. 107 ,r 56. Regardless of what treatment the Industrial
Commission had in mind, the evidence of Respondent's treatment history is not medical expert
testimony establishing causation to a reasonable degree of medical probability.
Notably, Respondent's treatment history was not a consideration in the causation
analyses by Dr. Frizzell, Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, Dr. Cox, Dr. Schwartsman, or Dr. Krafft. The
only doctor who found Respondent's response to any treatment of significance is Respondent's
pain management doctor, Dr. Thompson, the same doctor who did not pay attention to
Respondent's illegal use of marijuana and who boasted that she "can, generally, without
3 The Industrial Commission twice stated that Respondent had "injections." R. 107,f 56; R. 172.
However, the evidence shows that Respondent only had one injection by Dr. Gussner in the
groin, and it was not ultrasound guided. Ex. 28 at 1682; Gussner Tr. 17:7-22.
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objective testing data, know exactly what's wrong," based on her experience. Thompson
Tr. 23:9-13, 36:24-39:22. Dr. Thompson admittedly disregarded the lack of objective evidence
and instead relied on Respondent's response to opioid medication as evidence of nerve damage.
Thompson Tr. 13:12-18, 42:17-23. She also admitted that opioid medication can be used to treat
other conditions and that Respondent did not respond to neuropathic drngs that are used to treat
nerves. Id., 18:20-19:8, 30:7-13. These admissions and her failure to pay attention to
Respondent's use of marijuana completely undermine her testimony that Respondent's response
to opioid medication is evidence of the cause of the pain that she treated.
In sum, Respondent's treatment history, including the use of opioid medication, is not
evidence as to the cause of the pain being treated nor is it medical expert testimony within a
reasonable degree of medical probability that a right-side back injection caused nerve damage
impacting Respondent's left groin.

d.

The lack of an alternative explanation of Respondent's pain does not
meet the applicable standard.

The Industrial Commission further supported its finding of causation by rejecting the
diagnosis of iliopsoas bursitis as the cause of groin pain and suggesting that there was no other
reasonable explanation provided by Appellants as to the cause of pain. R. 110 if 65, 172-73.
However, the lack of an alternative diagnosis is not evidence of causation to a reasonable degree
of medical probability. Although the lack of an alternative diagnosis may be used to evaluate the
weight of opinions given by other doctors, this is not how the Industrial Commission utilized the
evidence. Rather, the Industrial Commission used this evidence as a factor in evaluating the
overall weight of the evidence and implied that Appellants bore the duty of establishing a
persuasive alternative cause to avoid a finding in Respondent's favor. R. 110 if 65, R. 164
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(suggesting that it could rely on purported shortcomings of Respondent's expe11 testimony to
find causation).
Nothing in Idaho's workers' compensation law imposes a duty on an employer to prove
an alternative explanation for causation that is more probable than what a claimant alleges.
Further, the lack of an alternative explanation that the Industrial Commission finds persuasive is
not grounds for an affirmative finding of causation in Respondent's favor. This is especially true
where the alternative explanation the Industrial Commission rejected, a diagnosis of iliopsoas
bursitis, is the only diagnosis supported by objective evidence in the record. Ex. 27 at 1651,
Ex. 28 at 1730-31; Hajjar Tr. 29:4-30:3; Gussner Tr. 32:16-33:12; Cox Tr. 37:14-23, 35:2436:8. There may yet be other explanations for Respondent's pain. Appellants do not have an
obligation to explore all other possibilities.
The issue the Industrial Commission must decide is whether Respondent met his burden
of proving causation to a reasonable degree of medical probability with medical expert
testimony. The Industrial Commission did not make this finding and thereby e1Ted.

2.

The Industrial Commission failed to determine the weight to be given
medical expert opinions and instead formed its own medical opinion.

The Industrial Commission concluded that "any persuasive medical evidence in addition
to a temporal relationship may tip the scale in favor of causation." R. 110-11

,r,r 65, 67.

It then

proceeded to use piecemeal testimony of various doctors, its own misplaced conjecture, and
evidence not considered by medical experts to form its own medical opinion that the right-side
back injection caused the left-side groin pain. Id.; R. 170-73. In so doing, the Industrial
Commission acted outside of the bounds of its authority.
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"[C]ausation must be proved by expert medical testimony." Hart, 130 Idaho at 299,
939 P.2d at 1378 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. Ha,per's Inc., 143 Idaho 193,
196, 141 P .3d 1062, 1065 (2006). When there is conflicting medical testimony, "the
Commissio n is not required to liberally construe the facts in favor of the worker." Mazzone v.

Tex. Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 756 (2013) (emphasis added). The Commissio n's role is
"to determine the weight and credibility of testimony and to resolve conflicting
interpretations of testimony." Jordan, 160 Idaho 794, 799 (2016) (emphasis added). In
deciding what weight to give conflicting testimony, the Commission may consider the
methodologies of all the experts, their examinations of the claimant, and their consideration of
the claimant's medical history. Mazzone v. Tex. Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 756-57 (2013).
The Industrial Commission did none of this.

"[T]he Industrial Commission must not "substitute[e] [its] own lay understanding of
medical information to reach a medical opinion commonly reserved to an expert."

Corgatelli v. Steel W., Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 297, 335 P.3d 1150, 1160 (2014) (emphasis added),
ove1ruled on other grounds by Oliveros v. Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., 165 Idaho 53, 438 P.3d 291
(2019). "[O]pinion evidence from a medical expeli" is required for the Industrial Commissio n to
find causation. Anderson v. Harper's Inc., 143 Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2006).
Appellants presented evidence that completely undermined the credibility and weight of
opinions by Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell, the two doctors Respondent relied upon to establish
causation. This evidence included the cross-examination testimony of these two doctors and
conflicting opinions of five doctors, Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, Dr. Cox, Dr. Schwa1isman, and
Dr. Krafft. R. 67-77. However, the Industrial Commission did not consider the methodologies

- 18 49508.0010.13254168.5

of the experts, evaluate the credibility of the experts (or the lack thereof), or otherwise weigh the
opinions to resolve the conflict and determine which medical expert's opinion(s) should be
followed. Rather, it decided:
There is no one doctor whose opinion carries the most weight;
rather, when the evidence is pieced together from various
statements and admissions of the [medical] experts, the totality of
the testimony and evidence [including Respondent's testimony and
Dr. Frizzell's opinion] support the position of Dr. Thompson that
'something happened' at Claimant's January 8, 2015 injection.
R. 110 ,r 65. This conclusion constitutes nothing more than an unqualified medical opinion
based in part on testimony that was taken out of context and medical information that was not
relied upon by any expert. By forming its own opinion, the Industrial Commission was able to
reach the desired outcome and bypass the weight and credibility problems with Dr. Thompson
and Dr. Frizzell's opinions.

a.

The Industrial Commission accepted Dr. Thompson's position
without weighing the foundation of her opinion or evaluating her
credibility.

In agreeing with the "position" of Dr. Thompson that "something happened," the
Industrial Commission completely ignored the reasons why her position lacked a reasonable
foundation and should not be given weight. See R. 97-98 ,r,r 29-30, 105-06 ,r 54. The Industrial
Commission also failed to acknowledge any of the problems with Dr. Thompson's credibility.
See id. Although the Industrial Commission stated in its decision denying the motion for

reconsideration that Appellants were "incorrect in their assertion that the Referee did not weigh
the reasons why Dr. Thompson's opinion should not be adopted," it provided no evidence of any
such analysis. R. 164. Had the Industrial Commission actually weighed Dr. Thompson's

- 19 49508.0010.13254168.5

opinion in light of all of the other medical opinions, it would have dete1mined that
Dr. Thompson's opinion provided no credible foundation for a finding of causation.
That the Industrial Commission failed to weigh Dr. Thompson's opinion is first
demonstrated by the fact that the Industrial Commission did not consider the problems with
Dr. Thompson's methodologies. Dr. Thompson never performed a thorough examination of
Respondent. Thompson Tr. 23:24-24:10; Ex. 30 at 1755. Rather, her examination consisted
only of watching Respondent walk and palpitating the left groin. Thompson Tr. 23 :24-24: 10;
Ex. 30 at 1755. She did not check range of motion, reflexes, and sensation in the lower
extremities as did Dr. Gussner and Dr. Cox. Gussner Tr. 9:4-19; Ex. 28 at 1657-58; Ex. 32 at
2001-02. Also, Dr. Thompson claimed not to need objective evidence to diagnose the cause of
pain. Thompson Tr. 23 :9-13, 23 :24-24: 10; Ex. 30 at 1755.
Second, the Industrial Commission did not consider that Dr. Thompson demonstrated a
lack of understanding of medical terminology and rep011s. She admitted not understanding the
contents of Dr. Orme's reports or the concept ofnonanatomic symptoms and tried to downplay
her lack of understanding by accusing the neurologist of using ''jargon." See Thompson
Tr. 24:4-10, 32:2-9. Notably, Dr. Frizzell, Dr. Gussner, and Dr. Cox had no problem
understanding Dr. Orme's report and the fact that Respondent had nonanatomic (a.k.a
nonorganic) findings, i.e., that Respondent did not show pain within a particular nerve
distribution. Frizzell Tr. 31:23-32:13; Gussner Tr. 37:33-38:15; Cox Tr. 36:12-37:13.
Dr. Hajjar also understood the report and found significant that it showed no "evidence of what's
called denervation, which is findings that will occur in muscle after the nerve that goes to the
muscle is injured." Hajjar Tr. 28:8-29:3.
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Third, the Industrial Commission did not even mention Dr. Thompson's failure to pay
attention to Respondent's illegal drug use over a two-year period while he also took opioid pain
medication that she prescribed. After Respondent's second positive test for marijuana,
Dr. Thompson told Respondent that use of THC creates a conflict with the pain clinic, and
Respondent agreed not to use it. Ex. 30 at 1776, 1779. (Respondent tested positive at his first
visit, but those results do not appear to have been discussed with him. Id. at 1761, 1765, 1768,
1774.) During the next two years, Respondent underwent six additional drug tests, all of which
were positive for high amounts of THC. Id. at 1786, 1833, 1935, 1941, and 1953-54.
Dr. Thompson did not address this illegal use of marijuana with Respondent until almost two
years had passed, disregarding her own rule that she will not continue to prescribe opiates to a
patient who continues to use illegal substances, including marijuana. Ex. 30 at 1951; Thompson
Tr. 34:18-35:20, 37:15-38:22. Dr. Thompson also admitted not spending much time reading
medical journal articles on marijuana, Thompson Tr. 40:1-3, and consequently, is not keeping up
to date on potential consequences of letting a patient use opioid medication at the same time as
marijuana. In sum, Dr. Thompson turned a blind eye to Respondent's use of an illegal substance
while taking opioid pain medication, and she did this despite the fact that she was continuing to
prescribe large amounts of opiates over a long period of time in the midst of an opioid crisis.
Finally, the Industrial Commission did not evaluate the problems with Dr. Thompson's
opinion in light of testimony by other expe1ts. Dr. Thompson was quick to reject objective
findings and conclude that Respondent's pain must be neuropathic because it arose around the
time of the injection. Thompson Tr. 13:7-18. Conversely, three other doctors provided medical
explanations as to why the objective findings rule out a nerve injury. One reason that all three
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doctors cited was the normal nerve conduction studies. Hajjar Tr. 20:3-1 O; Gussner Tr. 30: 1031 :25; Cox Tr. 37:14-23. Dr. Hajjar also pointed out that when Respondent was examined by
Dr. Orme more than three years after the injection, Respondent did not have any evidence of
muscle changes in the lower leg that would be expected with an injured nerve. Hajjar Tr. 28:829:3. Dr. Cox pointed out that Respondent's reported symptoms were outside a peripheral nerve
distribution and that Respondent's muscle reflexes were normal, which is inconsistent with a
nerve injury. Cox Tr. 37:9-11. Dr. Gussner found pain focalized in the groin during his
examination of Respondent and noted that focalized pain is more consistent with bursitis from
tight hip flexors than a nerve injury from the back. Gussner Tr. 58:7-13, 76:20-77:7; Ex. 28 at
1730-31. Dr. Hajjar also explained that focalized pain, rather than radiating symptoms, is
inconsistent with nerve injury. Hajjar Tr. 20:12-15.
Dr. Thompson offered no explanation for her opinion other than the alleged temporal
onset of pain and Respondent's response to opioid treatment. Thompson Tr. 13:9-23, 19:12-24,
42: 12-23. She provided no medical explanation as to how a right-side injection could cause
permanent nerve damage impacting the left groin and not be seen by way of nerve conduction
studies or muscle changes. See Thompson Tr. 12:9-13:23, 15:2-10, 19:14-20. She also
demonstrated a lack of interest in finding and understanding objective evidence or in addressing
Respondent's illegal use of high levels of marijuana and how that would impact a causation
analysis under the current scenario. Id. 40:1-41 :24. For these reasons, Dr. Thompson's opinion
lacks credibility and should not have been given any weight. See Beardsley v. Idaho Forest

Indus., 127 Idaho at 407, 901 P.2d at 514 (affirming the Industrial Commission's decision not to
rely on an opinion of a medical provider because the opinion lacked soundness).
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The Industrial Commission erred in accepting Dr. Thompson's position without weighing
the foundation for her opinion or her credibility.

b.

The Industrial Commission accepted Dr. Frizzell's opinion as a
partial basis for its opinion without weighing the foundation of his
opinion or evaluating his credibility.

The Industrial Commission used Dr. Frizzell' s opinion as a pa1tial basis for its decision,
stating that this opinion helped tip the scale in Respondent's favor. R. 111

,r 67.

However, the

Industrial Commission provided no analysis as to why that opinion carried more weight than the
opinions of Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, Dr. Cox, Dr. Krafft, and Dr. Schwaitsman so as to allegedly
tip the scale.
As the Industrial Commission correctly pointed out, Dr. Frizzell admitted on crossexamination that nerve conduction studies look for nerve dysfunction and that there is no
objective evidence of nerve dysfunction from nerve conduction studies. R. 96-97; Frizzell Tr.
23 :7-21. Also, although this was not acknowledged, Dr. Frizzell admitted that there is no
evidence of nerve impingement from the CT scan that he ordered. Frizzell Tr. 10:1-14, 20:1821: 1. Dr. Frizzell fu1ther admitted that the research article he cited to support his opinion
actually has no application to this case because Respondent's experience was entirely different
from the subjects in the study. R. 97; Frizzell Tr. 30:7-31 :5. Finally, Dr. Frizzell admitted that
he relied solely on the temporal onset of pain to supp01t his opinion, Frizzell Tr. 33:23-34:11;
and the Industrial Commission recognizes that temporal onset is not sufficient to support a
finding of causation, R. 110 ,r 67, R. 173.
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Dr. Frizzell' s admissions reveal that his opinion is without credible basis and should not
be given any weight. The Industrial Commission erred in giving any credence to Dr. Frizzell's
opinion without actually weighing it as compared to the opinions of the other medical providers.

c.

The Industrial Commission formed its own opinion and thereby
exceeded its role as finder as fact.

The Industrial Commission ultimately decided the single issue of causation by forming its
own medical opinion. First, the Industrial Commission improperly cherry picked testimony of
medical experts to support its conclusion rather than weighing the evidence to determine which
medical opinion(s) should be followed. Second, the Industrial Commission improperly used its
own lay understanding of medical information, i.e., conjecture, to assess Respondent's
credibility, reject Dr. Cox's opinion, and find that Respondent had an onset of pain at the time of
the injection that supported a finding of causation. Third, the Industrial Commission improperly
used evidence that was not relied upon or considered by any of the medical experts, including a
CT scan of Respondent's hip/pelvis and purp011ed shortcomings of the images of the injection at
issue. Fourth, the Industrial Commission improperly drew conclusions about the evidence that
are not supported by medical expert testimony or the record as a whole, including misstating
expe11 testimony.
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the Industrial Commission and its
referees are not at liberty to interpret medical evidence "to form [their] own medical opinions."

Mazzone, 154 Idaho at 759, 302 P.3d at 727. Nor is the Industrial Commission pe1mitted to take
notice of whatever medical information it likes and draw conclusions from it in the absence of
medical expe11 testimony. Id. at 760, 302 P.3d at 728. In Mazzone, the referee formed her own
medical opinions and thereby exceeded her authority as finder of fact. She did this in two ways.
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First, she interpreted a manual to form her own medical opinion that two doctors had improperly
diagnosed the claimant. Id. at 759, 302 P.3d at 727. Although she could have used the manual
to weigh the methodologies of two qualified experts, she did not do this. Id. Instead, she
improperly used her own lay understanding of a document to conclude that a specialized doctor
improperly made a medical diagnosis. Id. at 759-60, 302 P.3d at 727-28. Second, the referee
made findings regarding the claimant's prior medical condition based on her own assessment of
the claimant's prescription history. Id. at 760,302 P.3d at 728. This was improper because the
prescription history had not been referenced at hearing or by any expe11. Id. "[T]he Commission
cannot take notice of whatever it likes[;] witnesses are still necessary." Id.
This holding was reiterated in Corgatelli. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the
Industrial Commission "may weigh the evidence provided, but it may not inject its own
unqualified medical opinion to draw a conclusion from the evidence." Corgatelli, 157 Idaho at
297, 335 P.3d at 1160. In that case, the Industrial Commission "exceeded its fact-finding role by
relying on its own unsupp01ted medical opinion 'that in the absence of multilevel problems,
surgeons typically prefer to limit fusion procedures to levels where it is absolutely
necessary .... ' to conclude that the 2009 L2-5 fusion addressed injuries from the 1994 and 2005
accident." Id. There was no medical evidence in the record to support the Industrial
Commission's opinion, making it an "improper use of its specialized knowledge as a substitute
for the evidence." Id.
The Industrial Commission committed similar en-sin this case as in Mazzone and

Corgatelli.
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i.

The Industrial Commission used piecemeal testimony to draw
a conclusion.

In making findings of fact and drawing conclusions of law, the Industrial Commission
exceeded its authority because it used piecemeal medical testimony to form its own independent
opinion that the injection caused the groin pain. As explained above, the Industrial Commission
selected piecemeal testimony by Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner even though these doctors testified
that there was not sufficient objective evidence to conclude that the injection caused the groin
pain on a more probable than not basis. None of this piecemeal testimony by Dr. Hajjar and
Dr. Gussner was relied upon by other providers who offered opinions. Nor did the Industrial
Commission use this select testimony to evaluate the weight or credibility of (a) the doctors who
offered it or (b) the only two doctors who offered an opinion that the injection caused the groin
pain, Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell.
As discussed above, Dr. Hajjar testified that it is possible for the L3 nerve to innervate
the groin. Hajjar Tr. 9:14-24. Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Thompson also recognized this possibility.
However, this possibility was not the ultimate reason for the opinions of any of these three
doctors. Nor could it be a basis because there is no medical evidence in this case that the doctor
who performed the injection actually hit the L3 nerve on a more probable than not basis.
Further, there is no evidence that any of the nerves from the L3-L4 level on the right side of the
back innervate the left groin or that they are likely to innervate that region. The ultimate basis
for Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Thompson's opinions is the temporal onset of pain. Frizzell Tr. 33:2334:11, Thompson Tr. 12:9-13:23. Neither Dr. Frizzell nor Dr. Thompson attempted to offer any
explanation as to what nerve was causing Respondent's pain. See R. 108 , 57 (recognizing that
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neither doctor expressly stated that the injection hit a nerve on the right side that impacted the
left groin).
Dr. Gussner testified that some level of nerve damage might not be picked up in
electrodiagnostic testing. Gussner Tr. 32:2-6. Likewise, Dr. Frizzell recognized that it is
possible to have nerve pain without a positive test result. Frizzell Tr. 12:3-23. However, this
possibility was not a basis for Dr. Frizzell's opinion that the injection caused Respondent's pain.
As Dr. Frizzell admitted, the negative test finding resulted in a lack of objective evidence to
support causation. Id. 33 :5-8. Due to the lack of objective evidence, Dr. Frizzell admitted that
his opinion was based solely on what Respondent rep01ied to him regarding the temporal onset
of pain. Id. 33 :23-34: 11.
As in Mazzone, the Industrial Commission in this case attached significance to medical
info1mation (e.g., piecemeal testimony) without medical expert opinions that made the select
information significant, let alone a basis for finding causation to a reasonable degree of medical
probability. By selecting piecemeal statements of multiple doctors rather than dete1mining
which medical opinions should be followed, the Industrial Commission ultimately issued its own
medical causation opinion that lacks medical foundation.
ii.

The Industrial Commission reached a decision by giving
weight to conjecture not supported by medical expert
testimony.

In denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, the Industrial Commission exceeded
its authority in looking to the possible effect of local anesthetic administered at the time of the
injection to interpret discrepancies in Respondent's testimony and conclude that the injection
caused an immediate onset of pain to the groin that is still the source of Respondent's reported
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grom pam. R. 170-71. None of the multiple doctors providing medical opinion in this matter
stated an opinion regarding the potential impact of the local anesthetic on the groin pain in
forming an opinion on causation. Yet the Industrial Commission disregarded the lack of any
medical testimony and factored local anesthetic into its analysis to explain (1) why Respondent
failed to document on the Diagnostic Block Sheet an immediate onset of ove1whelming pain at
the time of the injection, and (2) why it questioned Dr. Cox's medical judgment regarding this
matter. R. 170-71.
Respondent wrote on the Diagnostic Block Sheet that he "became very uncomfortable a
few hours after injection." Ex. 32 at 2025-26. Dr. Hajjar testified that if Respondent was going
to have pain in the groin from the injection, the pain would have been immediate and
"overwhelming." Hajjar Tr. 32: 17-24. Dr. Gussner also testified that if an injection hits a nerve,
the typical response is "immediate nerve pain." Gussner Tr. 27:8-9. Likewise, Dr. Cox testified
that he would expect to see a "spike" in pain if an injection hit a nerve. Cox Tr. 16:24-17:12.
All three of these doctors, including Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner, found significant that
Respondent did not document an immediate onset of pain in his groin. Hajjar Tr. 22:22-23:23;
32:17-24; GussnerTr. 34:16-35:17; Cox Tr. 15:9-17:12, 64:20-65:5.
Unlike these three doctors, the Industrial Commission concluded that Respondent must
have had an immediate onset of left groin pain caused by the right-side injection because this is
what he testified to during hearing. R. 171. To justify its conclusion, it turned to Dr. Cox's
testimony regarding the impact of local anesthetic and inserted its own medical opinion to
discredit Dr. Cox's testimony on this topic. R. 170-71. It did this by stating the left groin pain
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"may have been masked, to some extent, by the local anesthetic." R. 171. There is no expert
testimony in the record to support this statement.
Dr. Cox offered no testimony to suggest that a local anesthetic applied to the back could
mask or delay the onset of pain in the groin. When Dr. Cox testified regarding the impact of the
local anesthetic, he referred to the region that was actually injected, which was also the area
where Respondent had reported pain both before and after the injection, the lower back. Cox Tr.
17:3-12; Ex. 35 at 2042. On the Diagnostic Block Sheet, Respondent reported overall decreased
pain for more than 24 hours after the injection, after the local anesthetic wore off, and this
indicated to Dr. Cox that the injection did not hit a nerve in the back. Cox Tr. 17:3-12; Ex. 35 at
2042, 2055. Dr. Cox looked to Respondent's overall documented response to the injection in
evaluating whether the injection may have impacted a nerve travelling to the groin. Cox Tr.
15:12-17:12. Contrary to the Industrial Commission's suggestion, Dr. Cox offered no testimony
that "local anesthetic might significantly diminish Claimant's groin pain." R. 170; Cox Tr.
15:12-17:12. Neither did any other doctor in this case.
To suggest that local anesthetic applied to the back could diminish sensation in the groin
is contrary to the basic definition oflocal anesthetic. https://www.meniam-webster.com/
dictionary/local%20anesthesia (defining local anesthesia as "loss of sensation in a limited and
usually superficial area produced especially by an anesthetic affecting only a part of the body")
(last visited Oct. 27, 2020). Notably, the Industrial Commission identified no medical opinion
that calls into question Dr. Cox's testimony regarding the injection or the impact of the local
anesthetic.
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Importantly, Dr. Cox's testimony is consistent with that of Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner,
and the Industrial Commission did not address this. All three doctors acknowledged that
Respondent reported having new groin discomfort around the time of the injection and that
Respondent has continually complained of groin pain since then. They simply concluded that
the evidence did not support a finding that Respondent's reported groin pain was caused by the
injection despite the fact that the pain developed around the time of the injection. Hajjar Tr.
23:2-23, 25:4-14, 32:10-33: 12; Gussner Tr. 22:7-11, 34:16-35:17; Cox Tr. 12:16-13: 10, 41 :1225, 61 :22-62:24.
By using its own conjecture and purported medical understanding of local anesthetic to
call Dr. Cox's testimony into question, the Industrial Commission did the very thing that the
Idaho Supreme Comt held improper in Mazzone. The Industrial Commission used its own lay
understanding, rather than expert testimony, to draw a conclusion regarding the cause of
Respondent's groin pain.
iii.

The Industrial Commission gave weight to evidence not
considered by medical experts.

In rejecting the iliopsoas bursitis diagnosis and accepting the injection as the cause of
pain, the Industrial Commission gave weight to the fact that a CT scan from June 2015 did not
show bursitis, that there had been no diagnosis of bursitis until January 2017, and that the
imaging of the injection showed only a point in time. R. 107 if 56, 109 ,r 63, 172. None of the
doctors providing medical opinions in this case gave any weight to these things. Indeed, none of
the doctors found these things notable enough to even mention when providing the basis for their
opinions. For the Industrial Commission to give weight to these three things in deciding
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causation when no doctor assessed any importance to them crosses well beyond the boundary
between evaluating the evidence and forming its own medical conclusions.
Here, the Industrial Commission used Respondent's June 2015 CT scan of the hip/pelvis
to first question the opinions held by Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, Dr. Cox, Dr. Schwartsman, and
Dr. Krafft that the more likely explanation for Respondent's condition is iliopsoas bursitis.
R. 107 ,r 56. The decision states: "If Claimant's pain originated from an iliopsoas bursitis, it is

not clear why the bursitis did not show up on CT scan, did not respond to steroid injections, and
did not respond to other conservative treatment .... " Id.

,r 56.

However, none of the medical

experts, including Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Thompson, offered testimony that the lack of a finding of
bursitis on the CT scan was significant. In fact, there is a statement from Dr. Hajjar, not
referenced by the Industrial Commission, that supports a conclusion that the 2015 CT scan was
not significant. Also, Dr. Gussner and Dr. Cox both offered an explanation as to why
Respondent did not respond to a single injection that Dr. Gussner gave in 2015 for suspected
bursitis. (The Industrial Commission only recognized Dr. Gussner's explanation. R. 107 n.5.)
The CT scan was ordered by Dr. Hajjar and was not ordered for the purpose of looking
for bursitis. Dr. Hajjar ordered the CT scan after Dr. Krafft stated that the gluteus medius muscle
was a "very likely" source of Respondent's pain. Ex. 25 at 1622-23. When Dr. Hajjar received
the CT scan results, he stated:
I had an opportunity to review Steven's new scan today June 5,
2015, including his CT scan of the hips and pelvis. This scan does
not demonstrate any pathological findings in the left sided
musculature. This is to be expected secondary to the fact that this
was only a CT scan and only major findings would be notable.
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Ex. 25 at 1624 (emphasis added). After the CT scan, Dr. Hajjar then refened Respondent to
Dr. Gussner for treatment. Ex. 28 at 1652. Dr. Gussner reviewed Dr. Hajjar's records, including
the CT scan, and yet still assessed the cause of the pain as likely being iliopsoas bursitis. Id. at
1652-59. When Respondent did not respond to an injection for iliopsoas bursitis, Dr. Gussner at
the time doubted that Respondent had iliopsoas bursitis. Id. at 1694-98, 1730-31. However, that
did not cause Dr. Gussner to think that Respondent had nerve damage from the back. See id.
A couple of years after the CT scan, Respondent underwent an MRI for the specific
purpose of looking for a "soft tissue contribution to his pain such as iliopsoas bursitis." Ex. 32 at
2006. The January 2017 MRJ finding of iliopsoas bursitis, id. at 2015, confirmed Dr. Gussner's
initial impression in 2015. Based on the MRJ, Dr. Cox concluded that Respondent had iliopsoas
bursitis, and he explained that someone may have persistent bursitis that does not respond to
treatment if there is an underlying mechanical issue such as tight hip flexors. Cox Tr. 27:5-28:8.
Dr. Gussner then received the MRJ and offered his opinion that Respondent does have iliopsoas
bursitis, which is likely due to tight hip flexors next to Respondent's total left hip replacement
that predates the 2014 accident. Ex. 28 at 1730-31; Gussner Tr. 34:3-9. Dr. Gussner
aclmowledged that he may have missed the bursae when he performed the injection in 2015
because he did not use an ultrasound-guided injection. Gussner Tr. 17:7-18:15.
Importantly, neither Dr. Thompson nor Dr. Frizzell offered an opinion that the lack of a
finding of iliopsoas bursitis on the 2015 CT scan was reason to reject that diagnosis as the cause
of Respondent's pain. The only reason that Dr. Frizzell gave for rejecting iliopsoas bursitis as
the cause of Respondent's pain was the temporal onset of Respondent's pain in relation to the
injection. See Frizzell Tr. 33:9-34:11. Dr. Thompson rejected iliopsoas bursitis as the cause of
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Respondent's pain only because she repo1tedly does not treat iliopsoas bursitis with a pain pump.
Thompson Tr. 14:2-15:10.
In addition to improperly using the 2015 CT scan to reject iliopsoas bursitis, the
Industrial Commission improperly rejected iliopsoas bursitis as the cause of Respondent's pain
because it was not first documented until January 2017. R. 172. Again, no doctor found this
delay in documenting the iliopsoas bursitis to be of any significance. What is more significant
than the Industrial Commission's conclusion is the fact that Dr. Thompson, who rejected the
diagnosis of iliopsoas bursitis as the cause of pain, did nothing to try and identify the cause of
Respondent's pain except to have him checked for a hernia in November 2015. Ex. 30 at 1755,
1768. Between December 2015 and January 2017, Dr. Thompson prescribed ongoing opiate
medications, but did not order any diagnostic test or send Respondent to an expert to look for
objective evidence of Respondent's pain. See generally Ex. 30. This course of care thereby
contributed to the delay in diagnosing the iliopsoas bursitis. Ex. 30 at 1768 (concluding that
Respondent's pain was "neuropathic in nature" even though there was "no clear underlying
objective testing to support the diagnosis"). She then proceeded to install a pain pump and give
Respondent large doses of opioid medication while ignoring that Respondent was also using
marijuana, confirmed by continual positive urinalyses she ordered but apparently never
reviewed. See supra§ IV.2.A.
In reality, iliopsoas bursitis provides the only objective evidence as to the cause of
Respondent's groin pain. All of the doctors providing opinions in this case acknowledge that
Respondent has iliopsoas bursitis. Frizzell Tr. 33:9-16; Thompson Tr. 15:8-10; Ex. 22 at 677;
Ex. 27 at 1651; Hajjar Tr. 29:4-18; Gussner Tr. 33:18-34:11; Cox Tr. 14:1-22. The only two
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doctors who rejected this diagnosis as the cause of Respondent's pain are Dr. Thompson and
Dr. Frizzell. They did so because they gave greater weight to the temporal onset of
Respondent's pain and the severity of the reported pain. Frizzell Tr. 33:9-34:11; Thompson Tr.
13:4-15:10. They did not rely on the timing of the diagnosis of iliopsoas bursitis.
Finally, the Industrial Commission questioned the medical opinions of the doctors who
relied on the image of the injection by noting that "[w]hile there are films showing the injection
site during Respondent's January 8, 2015 steroid injection, those images are 'point in time' and
do not show the entire process from start to finish." R. 109 ,r 63. The fact that the imaging
shows a point in time is not something considered by any of the seven doctors who have offered
opinions in this case-Dr. Frizzell, Dr. Thompson, Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, Dr. Cox, Dr. Krafft,
and Dr. Schwartsman. More importantly, Dr. Krafft, Dr. Gussner, and Dr. Cox found the
injection images significant because they show that the physician who performed the injection
did so at the indicated L3-4 level on the right side. Ex. 27 at 1651; Ex. 32 at 2025; Gussner
Tr. 29:24-30:6; Cox Tr. 15:9-17. Further, the point of the injection was "not close to the L3 or
the L4 nerve roots as they exit." Gussner Tr. 22:5-6. Dr. Gussner explained that Respondent
was less likely to have nerve damage from this type of injection shown in the images
(interlaminar epidural steroid injection) than from a transforaminal approach because the fmmer
is further from the nerve roots. Id. 22:1-11. Neither Dr. Thompson nor Dr. Frizzell commented
on what the imaging showed or that it was insufficient. Nor did Dr. Thompson or Dr. Frizzell
provide any testimony to discount the opinions of Dr. Krafft, Dr. Gussner, and Dr. Cox that the
injection was done at the proper level and away from the nerve roots. The Industrial
Commission's discount of the imaging is yet another example of the Industrial Commission
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improperly making its own clinical assessment that is completely unsupported by a medical
expert.
The Industrial Commission eITed by using the June 2015 CT scan of the pelvis/hip, the
timing in diagnosing the iliopsoas bursitis, and the imaging of the injection at issue to draw a
conclusion on causation. None of these three things constitutes medical expe11 testimony that
supp01is a finding of causation.

iv.

The Industrial Commission erred in drawing conclusions
about the medical testimony that is not supported by the
record.

The Industrial Commission drew conclusions about the medical expert opinions that are
not substantiated by the record. Appellants pointed these eITors out when it filed its motion for
reconsideration. R. 130-34. However, the Industrial Commission did not acknowledge any of its
eITors though given the oppo1iunity. Rather, the Industrial Commission drew an unsubstantiated
conclusion about Dr. Hajjar's opinion. R. 172.
In the Findings of Fact, the Industrial Commission stated in err: "Prior to the nerve
conduction studies, several doctors felt [Respondent's] complaints were consistent with nerve
damage." R. 107 if 57. The record provides no support for this statement. The first two nerve
conduction studies were in March and May 2015. Ex. 27 at 1641-47. Dr. Schwartsman
examined Respondent sho1ily after the injection at issue and before the nerve conduction studies.
Ex. 22 at 669. He simply noted that Respondent had started receiving treatment for L3-4
radiculopathy. Id. He did not diagnosis Respondent with nerve pain, let alone mention the
injection. Id. Dr. Hajjar also examined Respondent sho1ily after the injection, and he
recommended the first nerve conduction study. Ex. 25 at 1605. At that time, Respondent was
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complaining not only of groin pain but also of lower back pain. Id Dr. Hajjar did not comment
on whether Respondent's pain was consistent with nerve pain. See id. After Respondent's L3-4
surgery, Dr. Hajjar concluded that Respondent's pain was likely from his hip, not from the
nerves in his back. Id. at 1623, 1628, 1630. Dr. Gussner took over Respondent's treatment a
couple of months after the back surgery, and he quickly ruled out the back as the cause of
Respondent's pain. Ex. 28 at 1658, 1660. Dr. Gussner never diagnosed Respondent with nerve
pain from the injection. See generally, Ex. 28. Nor did he ever suggest that Respondent's
complaints were consistent with nerve damage. Id. The only two doctors who found
Respondent's back pain to be consistent with nerve damage, Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell, did
so in spite of negative nerve conduction studies and a lack of any other objective evidence. See
supra § IV .B.
The Industrial Commission next stated in en-: "Several doctors opined that Claimant's
notation of his groin area growing increasingly 'uncomf01table' in the hours following the
injection is immaterial to causation." R. 108 if 60. This statement also lacked any support in the
record. Dr. Hajjar, Dr. Gussner, and Dr. Cox all considered Respondent's "uncomfo1table"
documentation relevant in forming their opinions on causation. See Hajjar Tr. 23:2-23, 25:4-19;
Gussner Tr. 27:5-9, 34:16-25, 80:19-81:2; Cox Tr. 15:12-17:12; Ex. 32 at 2025. Dr. Frizzell
acknowledged that what Respondent wrote in the Diagnostic Block Sheet was different than
what Respondent told him but decided not to change his opinion when provided with this
information. Frizzell Tr. 33:23-34:11; 34:16-25. Dr. Thompson concluded that Respondent's
pain was "neuropathic in nature" based on what Respondent told her, long before she saw the
Diagnostic Block Sheet. Ex. 30 at 1768; Thompson Tr. 27:16-23. When provided the
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Diagnostic Block Sheet, she did not address the discrepancy in what Respondent wrote as
compared to what he reported to her but instead used the document to fmiher support her
conclusion that the injection "didn't go the way it's supposed to go." Thompson Tr. 8: 13-9:5.
In the Order Denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Industrial Commission stated:
Dr. Hajjar "concede[d] that if [Respondent's] discomfoti came on as he insists, something
unexpected happened to nerve root innervating [Respondent's] left groin." R. 172. Dr. Hajjar
made no such concessions, as evidenced by the following post-hearing deposition testimony:
Q. [by Appellants' counsel] Do you find anything abnormal
regarding the injection?
A. There is nothing technically abnormal. The issue here is that the
injection, as reflected by this big capital "R" on the picture, is that
it was done on the right side, and the patient's pain was left sided.
That doesn't go together with if something had happened as a
result of an injection to apparently damage a nerve, it would be

liard to hurt tlie left side from a rig/it sided injection
to.

ifyou tried

Q. [by Appellants' counsel] Is the fact that Mr. Tenny complains
that the pain happened at the time of the injection sufficient to say
that the nerve injection caused the pain?
A. If the pain occun-ed right as the injection was going on, then it
is by that history, much more likely something that you can say
that the injection caused the problem, and the problem would be
nerve damage. But given tlie history tltat is provided, and this is

in the original record with Jiis pain diagram, having it start a few
hours later is inconsistent with that type ofpatlwlogy.

Q [by Respondent's counsel]. Oh, one other thing on this
Exhibit 35, Bates No. 2055, you testified earlier that this statement
that, became very uncomfotiable within a few hours after the
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injection.· That that tells you that the pain did not start at the time
of the injection; is that correct?
A [Dr. Hajjar]. That's what that implies to me, yeah.
Q. But you don't know whether he meant that the pain started
within a few hours, or whether it just became very uncomfortable
after a few hours?
A. I'll say, it says what it says, which it says, became very
uncomfortable after a few hours. But what I had said earlier, is that
if this nerve was going to be injured by the injection, it would be
overwhelming at the time of the injection.
Q. So if the Industrial Commission as the trier of fact in this case,
if they found that the actual pain started at the time of the injection,
would that change your opinion?

A. If there was evidence to support the fact, it doesn't matter where
it comes from, that the pain as described started right when the
injection was being administered, then that implies potentially a
nerve injury.
Q. Okay.
A. But that's -- in my review of tltis, in all these records, that's
not what the record that I ltave seen supports.
Hajjar Tr. 22:12-21, 25:4-14; 32:10-33:12 (emphasis added). This testimony shows that
Dr. Hajjar only acknowledged a possibility of nerve injury. He never conceded that something
unexpected happened or that it was more probable than not that something happened. Nor did he
concede that Respondent sustained nerve injury as a result of the injection. Rather, he repeatedly
testified that the record does not support a conclusion that Respondent's left-side groin pain is a
result of the right-side injection.
The Industrial Commission erred in drawing the above conclusions as they are not
support by medical testimony.
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3.

The Industrial Commission misapplied its holding, relying solely on the
temporal onset of pain to find causation.

The Industrial Commission held that a temporal relationship is not enough to support a
finding of causation. R. 110-11

,r 67; R.

173. Yet, that is the sole basis for its decision, despite

its assertions to the contrary.
The Commission has consistently held that"[a] temporal relationship alone constitutes
insufficient grounds upon which to base a medical opinion." Chapman v. Trinity Health

Corp., No. IC 2011-012506, 2013 WL 3716405, at *14 (Idaho Ind. Com. June 19, 2013)
(emphasis added). This rule has also been applied in Idaho civil cases. Coombs v. Curnow, 148
Idaho 129, 141 (2009) (quoting Swallow v. Emergency Med. ofIdaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589,593
(2003) (recognizing that a district court properly excluded an expert opinion because it was
"based on statistically insignificant information and 'the mere temporal connection between the
drug and a ce11ain consequence'").
To find causation based solely on temporal relationship is a logical fallacy. Jelinek v.

Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. 2010) ("Care must be taken to avoid the post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy, that is, finding an earlier event caused a later event merely because it
occuned first. Stated simply, correlation does not necessarily imply causation."); West v Gen.

Motors C01p., 469 Mich. 177, 186 n.12, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003) ("[r]elying merely on a
temporal relationship is a form of engaging in the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc
(after this, therefore in consequence of this) reasoning") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A temporal relationship can ce11ainly raise a question of a possible causal relationship.
However, a possibility, by itself, is not sufficient to support a finding of causation. See Coombs,
148 Idaho at 141; Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 68 (Tex. 2007). As Dr. Gussner
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recognized, "There [can] be coincidences. Things can happen at the same time and not be
causal." Gussner Tr. 45:14-15.
In accepting the temporal onset of pain as the basis for its opinion, the Industrial
Commission relied on a coincidence. Incidentally, despite the diagnostic medical evidence
supporting the diagnosis, that is the very reason that it rejected the iliopsoas bursitis as the proper
diagnosis for Respondent's pain, because it would allegedly have been too much of a
coincidence. R. 172.
Although the Industrial Commission alleges that there is evidence besides temporal onset
to supp01i its decision, it has not identified any credible medical expert opinion that relies on
anything other than temporal onset. Nor has it identified any objective medical evidence or
reliable reasoning by an expert that would support the conclusion. Rather, it pointed out that
neither Dr. Frizzell nor Dr. Thompson offered any explanation as to how the nerves on the right
could innervate the left groin. R. 107 ,r 57. It also recognized that there is "sparse authority" for
their opinions. R. 108 ,r 58.
Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Thompson offered conclusory opinions on causation that rely on the
temporal onset of Respondent's pain. Neither offered any explanation as to how the injury could
have happened or that it is medically probable to injure the left side from a right-side injection.
See Thompson Tr. 13:12-18; Frizzell Tr. 33:5-8, 33:23-34:11. Dr. Frizzell frankly admitted that

his opinion is based solely on the temporal onset. Frizzell Tr. 33 :23-34: 11. Dr. Thompson also
admitted that her opinion is based on the temporal onset but attempted to justify her opinion by
pointing to the severity of Respondent's pain and his response to opioid medication. Thompson
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Tr. 13:7-15:10. However, Respondent's pain levels and response to medication is not a valid
basis to fo1m an opinion on causation.
Pain levels are "very subjective." Gussner Tr. 37:9-15. As Dr. Gussner explained,
people respond very differently to pain. Id. The mere fact that someone has pain, in and of
itself, is not evidence as to what caused the pain. Further, just as people respond differently to
pain, so they may respond differently to opioid medication. This is why Dr. Gussner noted that
some of Respondent's pain levels could have been induced by his use of opioids. Gussner Tr.
16:19-20. Dr. Cox explained that a person's perception of pain can actually increase while on
chronic opioids. Cox Tr. 30:18-31 :12. This is called hyperalgesia. Id. Respondent's continued
reports of high and worsening levels of pain are suggestive of hyperalgesia. Gussner Tr. 16: 1920; Hr'g Tr. 44:15; Ex. 4 at 60:12-14.
Moreover, opioids are used to treat many kinds of conditions, not just nerve pain. Cox.
Tr. 31:18-23; Thompson Tr. 30:7-13. Dr. Cox explained that opioid medication works by acting
on opioid receptors. Cox. Tr. 31 :18-23. Their purpose is to block pain signals, regardless of the
source. See Biological Effects, 4 Toxic Tolis Litigation Guide§ 47:5 ("Opioids are painrelieving drngs that do not treat the cause of the painful stimulus but rather decrease the
perception of the pain."); Commonly Used Terms, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention,
https ://www.cdc.gov/drngoverdose/opioids/terms .html (defining "Opioid" as " [n] atural,
synthetic, or semi-synthetic chemicals that interact with opioid receptors on nerve cells in the
body and brain, and reduce the intensity of pain signals and feelings of pain") (last visited Oct.
27, 2020). Consequently, they can be used to treat nerve pain and musculoskeletal pain. Cox.
Tr. 31:18-23.
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The fact that Dr. Thompson decided to use opioid medication to treat Respondent's
subjective pain complaints shows only that. It does not provide evidence as to the cause of
Respondent's pain. This is especially tme considering that lack of clear evidence that the opioid
medication is actually diminishing Respondent's perception of his pain.
The Industrial Commission implicitly recognized the problems with Dr. Frizzell and
Dr. Thompson's medical opinions, which is why it did not use those opinions as the basis for its
decision. However, these problems were not solved by looking to Respondent's testimony,
which only evidences a temporal relationship. Nor were they solved by looking to theoretical
possibilities that Dr. Hajjar and Dr. Gussner said were not sufficient to establish a medical
causation relationship on a more probable than not basis. Finally, these problems were not
solved by looking at Respondent's opioid treatment, which does not treat or otherwise provide
evidence of the underlying cause of pain. None of these things identify the cause of
Respondent's pain, leaving the Industrial Commission with temporal onset as the only possible
explanation for Respondent's pain from the injection. This temporal relationship is not sufficient
by itself to establish causation. To conclude otherwise would be a logical fallacy.

B.

The Record Is Void of Substantial and Competent Medical Evidence to Support the
Industrial Commission's Finding of Causation.
The Industrial Commission's decision that Respondent has groin pain as a result of his

steroid injection should be reversed because it is not supported by substantial and competent
medical evidence. Although the Industrial Commission points to evidence that it contends tips
the scales in favor of causation, none of that evidence is supported by any physical findings or
testing. In other words, the evidence lacks any objective foundation upon which a finding of
causation can reasonably be based.
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As discussed above, Respondent's testimony about the onset of his pain, his course of
opioid treatment, the possibility of a nerve from L3-4 innervating the groin, and the lack of
another explanation for the pain is not medical testimony that supports a finding of causation.
Further, none of these things constitutes objective evidence that supports a medical opinion that
Respondent has groin pain from the injection on a more probable than not basis.
In order for Respondent to have pain in his groin from the injection, the injection had to
have hit a nerve. This is not disputed. The mere fact that Respondent has pain in his groin does
not mean it is from a nerve. As Dr. Hajjar testified, "[t]here are many things that mimic nerve
pain." Hajjar Tr. 11:18-19.
There are only two doctors who concluded that Respondent has nerve pain in the groin as
a result of the injection. Neither of these two doctors, Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell, points to
any objective evidence to suppo11 their conclusion that Respondent has pain in his groin from a
nerve. Rather, both admit that there is no objective evidence. Dr. Thompson admitted during
her post-hearing deposition that "there's no objective evidence that shows what's wrong with
[Respondent] in his groin area," pointing only to the temporal onset of systems to conclude that
"something happened." Thompson Tr. 13:12-18. She also claimed to not need objective
evidence. Id. 23:9-13. Likewise, Dr. Frizzell admitted during his post-hearing deposition that
"there's no objective evidence that the nerves are actually the cause of [Respondent's] groin
pain," acknowledging that he relied solely on what Respondent told him about the onset of pain.
Frizzell Tr. 23:17-24, 33:5-8, 33:23-34:11.
Importantly, there is a plethora of objective evidence that Respondent's groin pain is not
from a nerve in his back. This evidence includes the following: ( 1) imaging of the injection,
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(2) the outcome of Respondent's back surgery, (3) physical findings during examinations by
treating doctors and an independent medical expert, and (4) test results.
The physician who pe1formed the injection on January 8, 2015, took images of the
injection. Ex. 25 at 2056-588. Dr. Gussner, who performs back injections like the one
Respondent received, explained that the images show that the injection was an interlaminar
epidural steroid injection at the L3-4 level, which was not close to the nerve roots as they exit.
Gussner Tr. 21: 1-8, 22: 1-6, 26:5-21. In other words, there is nothing in the images indicating
that the injection hit a nerve.
Approximately four months after the injection, in April 2015, Respondent had back
surgery. That surgery resolved his back pain but not his groin pain. See Ex. 25 at 1630.
Dr. Hajjar found this result significant because a decompression surgery is intended to treat
nerve pathology (which includes radiating symptoms). Hajjar Tr. 15:20-16:7, 20:11-12. This
was one of several reasons Dr. Hajjar concluded that Respondent did not have nerve pain. Id.
20:3-17.
Several months after surgery, in July 2015, Respondent was seen by Dr. Gussner, who
performed a physical examination. Ex. 28 at 1652, 1657. Dr. Gussner found, as Dr. Hajjar
observed and as Dr. Frizzell later found, that Respondent's pain was localized to the groin, i.e.,
spot pain. Ex. 28 1657; Gussner 21:16-18; Hajjar 20:13-15; Frizzell Tr. 5:19-22, 22:2-6.
Dr. Gussner explained: "[T]he pain was reproducible with direct palpation of the anterior hip,
reproducible with hip flexion, and it really seemed to be localized to the hip region." Gussner
Tr. 21 :17-20. These findings were significant to both Dr. Gussner and Dr. Hajjar because nerve
pain below the back is typically distributed over a region. Gussner 21 :21-25; Hajjar Tr. 20:13-
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15. In other words, the physical findings were inconsistent with a nerve injury. Ex. 25 at 1630,
1633; Ex. 28 at 1730-31. Both Dr. Gussner and Dr. Hajjar relied on these physical findings in
forming their opinions that Respondent's pain is more likely than not coming from the hip, not
the back. Gussner Tr. 20:9-20; Hajjar Tr. 20:3-17.

4

In December 2016, Dr. Cox examined Respondent for the purpose of an independent
medical examination. Ex. 32 at 1987, 2001-02. Dr. Cox found, as had Dr. Gussner, that
Respondent had some tenderness to touch in the groin when Dr. Cox palpated it. Cox Tr. 10:2511 :5, Ex. 32 at 2001. Respondent did not report any radiation down his thigh. Ex. 32 at 1999,
2008. Dr. Cox also found loss of range of motion in the left hip as well as regional weakness that
did not fit a pa1iicular nerve distribution. Cox. Tr. 10: 8-11, 11 :4-5. This examination raised
concerns about pathology in the hip, including the bursa, not nerve radiculopathy. Id. 13:7-15.
Dr. Cox explained that iliopsoas bursitis "can be worsened with movement at the hip, flexing the
hip, extending the hip, [and] internal rotation of the hip." Id. 22: 12-23. Dr. Cox took these
physical findings into consideration in concluding that Respondent's pain was not caused by the
injection. Id. 41:12-18 Ex. 32 at 2015, 2020.
A year and a halflater, in May 2018, Dr. O1me physically examined Respondent in
conjunction with nerve conduction studies. Ex. 34 at 2034. She repmied her findings as
follows:
Exam is notable for giveaway weakness in all manually motor
tested groups outside of a specific peripheral nerve or myotomal
distribution. He also repmis subjective hypoesthesia to pinprick in
all de1matomal distributions of the left lower leg. He does have

4 Dr. Gussner's initial assessment of Respondent in 2015 after ruling out a hernia, was hip
bursitis. Gussner Tr. 8: 19-23, 16: 1-4.
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pathologically brisk patellar reflexes (right > left) likely residua of
his prior lumbar myelopathy.

Id. These nonanatomical findings provided Dr. Orme with no evidence as to the cause of
Respondent's left groin pain. Id. at 2035 (concluding that Respondent's left groin pain was of
uncertain etiology). Dr. Gussner explained that the giveaway weakness is a subjective complaint
and that Dr. Orme found nothing objective to explain the symptoms. Gussner Tr. 38:9-18.
Dr. Orme went on to conduct nerve conduction studies that produced normal results.
Ex. 34 at 2035. She wrote in her report: "There is no electrodiagnostic evidence of a focal or
multifocal motor neuropathy, entrapment neuropathy, or polyneuropathy. Furthermore, there is
110

needle EMG evidence of active denervation or chronic neurogenic changes in any myofomal

distribution to confirm a lumbosacral radiculopathy." Id. Dr. Hajjar explained that the lack of

denervation meant a lack of muscular changes, which would be expected from a nerve injury,
especially more than three years after the fact. Hajjar Tr. 28:8-29:3.
This nerve conduction study by Dr. Orme was not the first nerve study. Dr. Krafft
conducted nerve conduction studies in March and May 2015. Ex. 27 at 1641, 1645. Both of
those studies also had nmmal results. Id. In other words, all three nerve conduction studies
show no evidence of a nerve injury causing the groin pain.
In addition to the normal nerve conduction studies, Respondent underwent an intrathecal
lumbar CT imaging study. Ex. 36 at 2077. Dr. Frizzell ordered this imaging test, which uses
dies to look at bones and nerves in the lumbar spine. Frizzell Tr. 10:1-8. According to
Dr. Frizzell, the results of this test "did not show anything that would account for [Respondent's]
symptoms." Id. 10: 11-14. In other words, like the nerve conduction studies, the CT imaging
provided no objective evidence of a nerve injury causing groin pain.
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In sum, Respondent has undergone numerous examinations by multiple doctors and
multiple forms of testing, all of which have provided no objective evidence of a nerve injury in
the back causing groin pain. The only objective finding in this case is iliopsoas bursitis, which
was shown on an MRI in January 2017. Ex. 36 at 2081. Dr. Thompson and Dr. Frizzell rejected
the objective finding to give Respondent's temporal onset of pain more weight. In doing so, they
offered no medical explanation for Respondent's pain that provides a reasonable basis to support
a finding of causation. The Industrial Commission implicitly recognized this by choosing not to
use these opinions as the basis of its decision. However, in the absence of medical opinions
founded on objective evidence to support a finding of causation, the Industrial Commission's
decision is lacking substantial and competent evidence and must be reversed.

V.

CONCLUSION

Because there is a lack of substantial and competent evidence to support the Industrial
Commission's decision, Appellants request the Court reverse the decision of the Industrial
Commission. In the alternative, Appellants request the Court vacate the decision and remand for
a decision that follows appropriate legal standards.

DATED THIS 27th day of October, 2020.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

efendants
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